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Background
Turkey was established as a secular republic in 1923, and was the
first predominantly Moslem country to formally do so; significantly,
the Turkish population is overwhelmingly Sunni Moslem regarding
formal religious identification. The meaning of “secular republic”
has varied over time, however, and has certainly varied in interpre-
tation by the relevant actors in Turkish political life, including
popular perceptions of what secularism should mean. The word
itself is ambiguous and may carry a wide array of meanings;
the Turkish word, laiklik1 is as intrinsically ambiguous as its
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1. “Laiklik” is a Turkish word, derived from the French “laicite,” meaning
roughly secularism; the principle of laiklik was one of the “six arrows” at the
foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey. The other five were republican-
ism (cumhuriyetçilik), statism (devletçilik), nationalism (milliyetçilik), populism
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French-derived origin, laicite.2 In the Turkish context, however,
it was initially instituted to convey a certain disposition of
civil authority to religion in which the state itself actively
embraced and fostered a nonreligious worldview in the public
realms (such as partisan politics, public education, media, etc.).
This approach has been called “active secularism” as opposed to a
politically “passive secularism,” on the part of the state, as is
claimed to prevail in the United States.3 This article provides
evidence that the Republic of Turkey has been experiencing an
array of political pressures to move away from its historical
“active secularism” to a more passive type. Regardless of where
these pressures lead, they have already changed the political land-
scape of Turkey in a significant manner. Below we describe how
and why this is so.
On November 3, 2002, Turkey’s fifteenth general parliamentary
election was won by the Justice and Development Party, known in
Turkish as the AK Party, an avowedly Islamic-oriented party that
had evolved from several previously extant Islamic parties. Since
that election, few would dispute that the character of religion–
state relations in Turkey has changed, but precisely how it has
done so is a matter of considerable dispute. This article explores
the contours of that change, provides an account of them, and
offers commentary on the likely directions of religion–state rela-
tions in Turkey. With a population of over seventy-four million, a
military estimated to be the eighth largest in the world, and a
vibrant economy of around 7 percent average annual growth since
the AK Party came to power until the recession of 2009, Turkey is
a pivotal country geographically, geostrategically, and in terms of
religion and politics in the Islamic world. Thus the manner in
which political secularism is changing in Turkey is highly
significant.
The principle of political secularism in the Turkish republic has
received extensive treatment in the scholarly literature; for our
2. The deepest etymological origin, however, is from the ancient Greek, “laos,”
or people in general, as distinguished from clerical figures. In the Hellenistic-
Greek New Testament, it is used over 140 times, in many but not all cases con-
noting a religious distinction of the general folk from religious leaders; Thayer
and Smith, "Greek Lexicon Entry for Laos,” The New Testament Greek Lexicon,
http://www.searchgodsword.org/lex/grk/view.cgi?number=2992 (accessed
November 27, 2009).
3. Ahmet T. Kuru, “Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the
Justice and Development Party,” in The Emergence of A New Turkey,
ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 137–
39. See also his much more expansive treatment of this theme in Secularism
and State Policies toward Religion: US, France, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
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purposes, a very brief overview will suffice.4 Historical sources of
Turkish laiklik include the ideas of the Young Turks in the latter nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, Atatürk’s ideas, and the heavy
role of Western influences on the post-Ottoman Turkish military;
ironically perhaps from a Western perspective, even various
Ottoman practices have been viewed as a source of the secular char-
acter of the twentieth-century Turkish Republic.5 When the Republic
was established on October 29, 1923, a particularly grave responsi-
bility was assumed by the military to safeguard the secular character
of the Turkish state, despite the fact that the principle of political sec-
ularism was not codified in the Constitution until 1928. These histor-
ical roots played a role in the historical germination of a pattern of
religion–state relations in the twentieth century that shaped the
character of the Turkish state. According to one interpretation, a
major underlying reason for the actively secular character of the
Turkish state is that, since religion in Moslem societies was arguably
even more pervasive and thorough-going in defining, shaping, and
guiding society than was Christianity in doing so in its respective
societies, it was imperative that the secular state in Turkey have a
more active role in guiding and controlling religion in society than
was the case in politically “passively secular” societies, the prime
exemplar of which is the United States.6
Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: The
Domestic Dimension
Turkey’s statehood thus was founded at the outset on a strict dis-
tinction between public religion and state authority. However, this
4. Major works include Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey
(New York: Routledge, 1998); Soner Cağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and National-
ism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (New York: Routledge, 2006); Barry
Rubin and Ali Çarkoğlu, Religion and Politics in Turkey (New York: Routledge,
2005) (previously published as a special issue of Turkish Studies). It should
be noted that the secularism demanded by the Turkish constitution has never
taken the form of essentially forced secularization of society as occurred in
the USSR under the Communist Party’s avowed aim of creating a new type of
society in which religion was to have been eventually abandoned by the popula-
tion as an unscientific and outmoded worldview.
5. Metin Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics,” Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 63–82.
6. Kuru, Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and
Development Party, 145. This view is not universally shared; however, as an
interpretation of the early Kemalist conception of laiklik; one view has it that
Atatürk’s intent and plan were for a “cognitive revolution” of secularization,
from which the political transformation into a secular state would thereafter
derive, taking the political form of laicite, as laiklik (the authors thank
Dr. Metin Heper for pointing this out).
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did not mean then, nor does it mean today, that the Turkish state
was not to involve itself in religious affairs; quite the contrary. A
particular understanding of secularism prevailed in Turkey from
the outset, and that historical understanding implied state control
of religion: the American constitutional principle of “free exercise
of religion,” both as an abstract juridical ideal and as a practical
guiding principle for adjudication, is not characteristic of Turkish
laiklik, and this must be grasped in order to understand the contem-
porary disputes over the proper role of the state in religious
matters. Significantly, among the various official institutions com-
posing the Turkish state, this concept of laiklik has been consis-
tently and staunchly supported by the military. This is doubly
significant because the military has been the most popularly
trusted state institution throughout the experience of the Turkish
republic. The military has consistently acted as the defender of
both “democracy against democracy” and secularism.7 This is no
small matter given the widespread popular perception that the
internal enemies of the Republic are as great and as menacing as
any external threat, particularly as of the latter 1990s.8
Internally, the various Islamist movements and the Kurdish ques-
tion were perceived as the main threats to both the foundational
principles of the Turkish state, and its practical, immediate viabil-
ity: if the “Islamists (however defined) took over, laiklik would be
no more; if the Kurds succeeded in dismembering Turkey to
create an independent state, the Kemalist Republic would be
fatally, territorially compromised. Therefore, the military may
be seen as the defender of a strict Jacobin-type secularism.”9
However, the victory of the AK Party in the 2002 election and forma-
tion of the first one-party government (as opposed to a coalition
government) in seventeen years changed the balance between reli-
gion and state. This trend was further augmented and fortified by
the prospect of EU accession in a complex interplay of domestic
and international factors, explored in more detail below. The roots
of the so-called Islamic movement that eventually manifested
itself in the AK Party’s electoral victory of 2002 in Turkey are to
be found in the 1980s; in the ensuing decades, it underwent
7. Metin Heper, “Conclusion—The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democ-
ratization in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 3, no. 1 (2002): 138–46.
8. Lerna Yanik notes that the Turkish “National Security Concept” of 1997
places radical Islam and Kurdish separatism at the top of the list of threats to
Turkey, reflecting a general shift in emphases of post-cold war threat perception
from external to internal ones; see “Allies or Partners? An Appraisal of Turkey’s
Ties to Russia,” East European Quarterly XLI, no. 3 (2007): 356–58.
9. See Hakan Yavuz, The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK
Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Series, 2006).
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various changes, which we explore below.10 Those changes have
been described as an “identity rupturing” of Turkish politics and
society, and as such cannot have failed to produce significant polit-
ical ramifications.
The Turkish military nonetheless consistently played a central role
in both general elite-level politics, and specifically in safeguarding
laiklik as a fundamental political principle. Significantly, the question
of religion, the state, and society manifested itself to a greater or
lesser degree in each of the four military coups d’etat undertaken in
the Republic: in 1960, the top civilian leadership was placed under
arrest and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was hanged on September
17, 1961, along with his foreign minister and finance minister. In
1971 the military again intervened, supplanting the government of
Suleyman Demirel and ruled for two years; on September 12, 1980,
the militarystruck again, resulting in a seachange in Turkish elite pol-
itics that one account describes as “Turkiye’nin Miladi” (the birthday
of Turkey).11 Finally, in 1997 the military staged a “soft coup,”
demanding that the government resign—or else. Since the military’s
ultimatum accused the political leadership of violating the norms
of laiklik, the government had good reason, based on precedent,
that the threat of direct military intervention was credible indeed.
Accordingly, the government compliantly resigned.
The 1990s witnessed a continuation of the increasing degree of
religiosity among the Turkish public that had its roots in the
1980s. This trend continued into the new century, seemingly
gaining momentum in the early twenty-first century. In November
2002 an avowedly Islamic party, the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AK Party), won a strong plurality of
10. Ali Bayramoğlu, Modernity Does Not Tolerate Superstition: The Religious and
Seculars in the Democratization Process (Ankara: TESEV, 2009), 41:
The rise of the Islamic movement in Turkey occurred around the
mid-1980s with the obvious influence of the Iranian Revolution. The
movement reached its zenith in the 1990s and led to a severe polarization
of religion and secularity. This 20-year period is of uttermost importance
for the inner buoyancy of the Islamic segment and the recreation of an
Islamic identity. It is both a time of integration, and a period of differen-
tiation due to the conflicts and interactions experienced by the Islamic
segment both within itself and with the secular segment. In other
words, while this period created the politically and socially differentiating
cornerstones of the Islamic identity after 1980, the experiences and con-
frontations during that time have had radical effects on the Islamic
segment and have triggered a wave of change. (emphasis added)
11. Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila, and Ridvan Akar, 12 Eylül: Türkiye’nin
Miladi (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999).
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votes in the general election (34 percent) which, owing to the very
high electoral barrier of 10 percent, garnered the party 363 of 550
parliamentary seats, easily enough to form the government. The
only other party to gain seats was the Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)—the party of Atatürk. The questions of
the role of religion in Turkish society—and of its relationship to
the state—were central to this election. In the next parliamentary
election of July 2007, the AK Party increased its proportion of the
vote to 46.6 percent, but won 23 fewer seats, at 341, since two
other parties had this time passed the 10 percent barrier (the
highest in the world, incidentally, and deliberately set very high by
the military in 1983). Polat notes:
Throughout the [2007] general election campaign, the AKP managed to
present itself as the victim of military intervention, and as the defender of
the “civilianisation” of Turkish politics. The AKP took obvious advantage
of being victimised in the presidential election while also portraying itself
as the champion of democracy. The presidential question dominated the
campaign on two levels: Secularism (How secular was the AKP’s candidate?)
andtheroleof theArmyinpolitics (should theArmyintervenetoprotectsec-
ularism?). The AKP insisted several times that it does not have any problem
with secularism and that secularism should be understood in tandem with
the other characteristics of the regime laid down in the Constitution.12
The reason that the AK Party had to “insist several times” that it
would abide by the Constitutionally mandated secularity of the
state is because its motives were not trusted.13
Did the AK Party represent the sort of clerical-type threat that had
served as the alleged foundation for the “soft coup” of 1997? In
many respects this question has been central to Turkish politics,
and has dominated it, since that event; accordingly, there is no
easy or straightforward answer to it, and popular, journalistic,
and scholarly opinion has varied dramatically. Özbudun viewed
the transformation of the AK Party itself into a mainstream political
party as having “monumental significance” not only for Turkey—
and particularly Turkish democracy—but also for the region, and
indeed the entire Islamic world:
the transformation of Turkish political Islam, once considered a serious
threat to the stability of democracy, into a moderate conservative demo-
cratic party is a development of paramount importance in Turkish
12. Rabia Karakaya Polat, “The 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey: Between
Securitisation and Desecuritisation,” Parliamentary Affairs 62, no. 1 (2009):
138.
13. This theme is pursued in depth in Ioannis Grigoriadis, “Islam and Democra-
tization in Turkey: Secularism and Trust in a Divided Society,” Democratization
16, no. 6 (2009): 1194–1213.
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politics. This development can be seen as a significant step toward bridg-
ing the age-old deep cleavage between secularists and Islamists, thus con-
tributing to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. The success or
failure of the AKP experience is likely to have repercussions beyond
Turkey’s borders and in the entire Islamic world. This radical change
from the practice of older Islamist parties seems to have been a function
of the realization by a wing of the former Islamist parties (RP and FP) that
challenging the secular character of the state in Turkey would be futile.14
At this point the role of the military in this question must be consid-
ered more deeply, since it has regarded itself—and has been rightly
regarded by much of the population—as the bulwark of the state’s
secular character amid the religious turmoil of the Near and
Middle East.
Military: Guardians of the Secular Republic
The Turkish military has long had complex relations with the civil
authorities and with Turkish society. For decades the military
acted as the guardians of “democracy against [too much] democ-
racy” by using power via certain channels such as the Presidency,
the National Security Council (MGK), and other state institutions,
including even the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri
Bakanliǧi). Nor was this pattern historically novel for the
Republic—its roots also are to be found in the Ottoman period.15
Two major factors shape the ideas behind military intervention:
the first concerns the perception of threat according to the Turkish
military. According to the military, Islamic fundamentalism and
Kurdish separatism became the most prominent domestic threats to
the Turkish State, and the military held the obligation to protect the
secular state by all means necessary.16 As noted above, by the latter
1990s these internal threats were perceived as the most menacing
ones. Also, and somewhat paradoxically, the military thus acts as
14. Ergun Özbudun, “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case
of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey,” South European Society and
Politics 11, nos. 3–4 (2006): 555.
15. Even in Ottoman Turkish statehood, military intervention occured; several
sultans, e.g., Alemdar Vakası (1808) and Bab-ı Ali Baskını (1913), were forced
to resign by the military.
16. Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law No. 211 of January 1961. Article
35 states: “The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the
Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution.”
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Justice, “Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service
Law,” Mevzuat Bilgileri, http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1044.html
(accessed February 12, 2010)—Gareth Jenkins’s translation in “Continuity and
Change: Prospects for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey,” International
Affairs 83, no. 2 (2007): 343.
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the guardian of laiklik even though the nation’s obligatory military
service is popularly associated with religious motives. Military
service is obligatory for every young healthy male in Turkey, reflecting
a longstanding martial tradition, long and well recognized by allies
and foes alike.17 Further, many Turks still refer to Turkey as an
Asker Millet—a military nation, reflecting an integral component of
the national identity.18 Significantly, this trait is curiously admixed
with a religious element, e.g., Turkish soldiers are traditionally
called Mehmetçiks, referring to the Prophet Muhammad, and military
service is Peygamber Ocağı—the Prophet’s House. Also, the essen-
tially religious concepts of Şehadet (martyrdom) and gazi (veteran)
refer to key values of Turkish society. Thus a certain degree of inher-
ent ambiguity, or even tension, exists regarding the military’s role as
defender, not only of the state and the nation, but also particularly
of the state’s secular character. Again, given the increased salience
of religion in public life, it was perhaps inevitable that such tension
would manifest itself more openly in the political process, and
indeed it has done so.19
On closer inspection, the military’s intervention in civil politics in
the name of protecting secularism stems from a variety of historical
and sociopolitical dynamics that have played themselves out differen-
tially in each case of overt intervention, and even in the ongoing, often
very subtle, intervention in national governance in between the coups
d’etat. The legacy of the Western-oriented Young Turks, the effective
military rule during the Warof Independence (1919–1922), the legacy
of Atatürk’s “six arrows” (of which laiklik is one), and the deep, tight
cultural fusion of military and religious symbols and expressions
make for a profoundly complex tapestry in which laiklik works
itself out in concrete practice. Since this overall pattern of historical
dynamics shaped the evolution of the military elite, civil–military
relations in Turkey are unique. Therefore, traditional theories of
civil–military relations are only marginally capable of providing an
accurate explanation of the patterns of the early twenty-first
century; e.g., Huntington’s professional army theory is not particu-
larly helpful in explaining the Turkish military’s unique position.20
17. Scott Taylor, Unreconciled Differences: Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan
(Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2010), particularly ch. 4, “The End of the Otto-
mans,” 90–110.
18. Ersel Aydınlı, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Doğan Akyaz, “The Turkish Military’s
March toward Europe,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006): 77–90.
19. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics
Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
20. Literature on civil–military relations in Turkey is extensive, predictably
reflecting not only conflicting Western interpretations and models but those
in Turkey as well. Even Chief of Staff General İlker Başbuğ stated that such the-
ories can only reflect a portion of the complex, historically conditioned realities
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A more accurate understanding of contemporary civil–military rela-
tions demands an understanding not only of the historical role of
the military in the Ottoman and Republic periods, but also of the
mindset and apparatus of the military and the general population—
and for that, the religious dimension is crucial. Again, the contempo-
rary situation is intriguing and significant precisely because of the
shifts in the content and form of that dimension.
The Turkish military’s understanding of democracy is akin to Gio-
vanni Sartori’s rational democracy theory.21 Therefore, two major
issues have arisen for the military in the past generation in particular:
modernization (meaning in this case essentially westernization), and
maintaining order. For both roles, protecting laiklik was fundamental,
to the point of determining for itself the extent, timing, and circum-
stances of intervention in civilian governance. Historically, a signifi-
cant element of that determination has been ongoing suspicion that
ostensible religious motives might serve as a pretext for political
ambition, to the point of fatally threatening laiklik. Thus historically,
the military employed several major channels of influence on civil
government: the presidency, the MGK, and various other state institu-
tions such as state security courts, and even indirect control of the
Religious Affairs Ministry. Beginning in 1999 and accelerating under
the AK Party government since 2002, however, the military’s influ-
ence on civil government has declined, to the point where the “Ergene-
kon” affair and even the “Balyoz” affair beginning January 2010
resulted in dozens of arrests of current and retired high-ranking mili-
tary officers on charges of illegally plotting another coup d’etat.
Matters became so strained that a summit meeting was held among
Prime Minister Erdogan, President Gül, and military Chief of Staff
General Başbuğ on February 25, 2010, the results of which were a tem-
porary political truce, but whose long-term effects appear certain to
portend a continuation of the shift in the character of laiklik.22
of the present period, e.g., those of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and
Eliot Cohen. İlker Başbuğ, “Chief of Staff Gen. Başbuğ’s Annual Evaluation
Speech at the Turkish Military Academy 14 April 2009,” Turkish General Staff,
http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_
Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerBaşbuğ_harpak_konusma_14042009.html
(accessed December 3, 2009). Also see: Nil S. Şatana, “Transformation of the
Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy,” Armed Forces & Society 34, no. 3
(2008): 357–88, and Nilüfer Narlı “Civil–Military Relations in Turkey,” Turkish
Studies 1, no. 1 (2000): 107–27, for overviews of the pertinent scholarly literature.
21. Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, “Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil–
Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects,” Armed Forces & Society 31, no.
3 (2005): 443.
22. For a summary of the Ergenekon and Balyoz affairs, as well as a summary
statement of the military’s declining influence, see “The Turkish Army: Coups
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The tripartite coalition government preceding the AK Party’s
acquisition of authority in 2002 was in the process of pursuing EU
candidacy, and amended several articles in the Constitution that
would result in a decline of the power of the MGK.23 These included,
for instance, the appointment of two additional civil ministers to
the MGK, so that such civilians would wield a majority in the
council; this ran utterly counter to the intention of the military gov-
ernments that initially established the MGK following the first mili-
tary coup in 1960. Even more dramatic changes occurred under the
AK Party government in 2002, which appointed a civil secretary to
the MGK and changed the frequency of the meetings from once in
a month to once in every two months. During this reform period,
then-chief of staff General Hilmi Özkök also played a crucial role.
A grand coalition formed between the military and civilian author-
ities to bring Turkey to the final step of modernization—namely
full EU membership.24 In this period, two prominent instruments
of military influence on civil government were transformed,
namely abolition of the State Security Court, and the MGK being
brought decisively under civilian authority. General Özkök faced a
serious challenge by the upper echelons of the military establish-
ment during his term, but prevailed.
Moreover, as of this writing, there are ongoing investigations and
trials regarding a plot to overthrow the government by coup d’état.
General Özkök’s successor General Büyükanıt was generally seen as
more favorable to protecting secularism. Also the presidential elec-
tion held during his term was significant. The presidency in Turkey
stands as a symbol of Atatürk’s legacy and historically the president
was elected from among retired Generals—until the presidency of
Turgut Özal (December 1989–October 1993). Even the presidential
palace—Çankaya—is often regarded as the symbolic but institu-
tionalized statement of laiklik. Further, the president had been
elected by the parliament until 2007 when a popular referen-
dum—sponsored by the ruling AK Party—changed the procedure
to direct popular election. This precipitated a near-crisis situation,
Away,” The Economist, February 13, 2010, 56–57. It offers: “If Turkey’s army is
beginning to lose its addiction to political meddling, it is in part thanks to the
efforts of the man at the top. General Başbuğ, who won a reputation for tough-
ness in the early 1990s during the height of the Kurdish insurgency in southeast
Turkey, is as strict a secularist as any. But he is well aware that the army’s per-
ceived aversion to Islam has contributed to its sagging popularity.”
23. That government was composed of three rather ideologically incongruous
political parties: Democratic Left Party (DSP), the rather right-leaning National
People’s Party (MHP), and the probusiness Motherland Party (ANAP), forming
a coalition led by left-leaning prime minister Bülent Ecevit.
24. Ersel Aydinli et al., The Turkish Military’s March toward Europe, 77–90.
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the core substance of which was, again, the meaning of laiklik:
during the 2007 presidential election, the AK Party’s candidate,
Abdullah Gül, and his head-scarf-wearing wife, raised in bold
relief the matter of what it means to have a self-avowedly
Islamic-oriented political party ruling over an avowedly, constitu-
tionally mandated secular state. In the pre-election atmosphere,
the meaning of laiklik became in some respects the main issue; at
the very least, it was certainly an issue for every political party.
Society became polarized regarding the issue, and meetings were
held in major cities with the participation of hundreds of thou-
sands, mostly claiming to protect secular political structure.25 The
Secular-Nationalist RPP (Republican People’s Party—CHP) appealed
to the Constitutional Court on April 27, 2007, to cancel the presi-
dential elections in the parliament; moreover, the same day the mili-
tary issued a press release by warning that the Chief of Staff was
“watching the question of secularism with deep concern.” This
was clearly a veiled threat to intervene again.26
The above statement, which is referred to as an e-muhtıra
(e-memorandum), implied two concerns. It showed that the military
would, regardless of the EU accession process, intervene in the civil
politics when secularism was threatened. Nevertheless, for the first
time in Turkish politics an elected government, the AK Party, stood
against the military’s threat of intervention in civil politics.
Then-spokesman of the government Cemil Çiçek replied to the
e-muhtıra with an even stronger declaration:
It is unthinkable that in a state governed by rule of law, the TGS [military]
as an institution under the Prime Minister, would speak against the gov-
ernment. The TGS is an institution under civilian governmental
command, and its duties and responsibilities are defined by the constitu-
tion. According to our constitution, the Chief of Staff is responsible to
Prime Minister because of the Chief of Staff’s stated duties and
authorities.27
25. “Tarihi Mesaj (Historical message),” Milliyet, April 15, 2007.
26. Turkish General Staff, “Press Release No:BA- 08/07 Date: 04.27.2007,” Press
Releases, http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_
Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html (accessed December 2, 2009):
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri yapılmakta olan tartışmaların ve olumsuz yöndeki
yorumların kesin olarak karşısındadır, gerektiğinde tavrını ve davranışlar-
ını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya koyacaktır. Bundan kimsenin şüphesinin
olmaması gerekir.
27. In the original Turkish: Başbakana bağlı bir kurum olan Genelkurmay Baş-
kanlığı’nın herhangi bir konuda hükümete karşı bir ifade kullanması demokra-
tik bir hukuk devletinde düşünülemez. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, hükümetin
emrinde, görevleri Anayasa ve ilgili yasalarla tayin edilmiş bir kurumdur.
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This unequivocally forceful and in fact unprecedented response by
the government changed the environment of civil–military relations;
it also shifted the meaning of laiklik to a certain degree. And after the
Constitutional Court cancelled the first round of the presidential
elections, the AK Party government found another solution for the
presidency. The Prime Minister and leaders of the AK Party brought
an initiative to change the Constitution, if necessary bya referendum,
and by going for an early parliamentary election.28 The early parlia-
mentary elections were held on July 22, 2007, resulting in the AK
Party increasing its share of parliamentary seats by gaining 46.7
percent of the popular vote. Even the party leadership did not
expect such an overwhelming victory. Then, on August 28, the pres-
idential election was held, with the AK Party candidate Abdullah Gül
elected. Finally, a popular referendum on September 21, 2009, was
held to amend the Constitution so as to provide for popular election
of the president for a five-year renewable term. The referendum also
changed the parliamentary term of office from five years to four
years. These events indicated that public favor of military involve-
ment in civil politics was waning. This trend increased after
General İlker Başbuğ was appointed as Chief of Staff on August 30,
2008, replacing General Büyükanit. This change of personnel led to
a gradual shifting toward what might be called a Huntingtonian per-
spective, with clearer safeguards for civilian control.29
Even though the demilitarization of Turkish politics had
advanced substantially in the early twenty-first century, numerous
questions and problems remained even after the events of 2007.30
Various plots to overthrow the government by a coup d’état,
Anayasamıza göre, Genelkurmay Başkanı görev ve yetkilerinden dolayı Başba-
kan’a karşı sorumludur.
For the full text see: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=219798
(accessed Februrary 12, 2009).
28. “Hodri Meydan (I dare you!),” Yeni Şafak, February 05, 2007.
29. General Başbuğ’s speech on April 14, 2009, reframed the new aspect of
civil–military relations and thus to a degree laiklik itself:
Huntington’a göre, silahlı kuvvetler üzerinde sivil otoriteye en sağlıklı ve
en etkin kontrolü sağlayan norm, "objektif kontrol"dur. Objektif kontrol
ise, askerlik mesleğinin profesyonel yeteneğinin artırılması ve askerlerin
politikadan uzaklaştırılması ile sağlanır. Bunun doğal neticesi olarak da
askerlere kendisini organize etme ve görevlerini yürütme açısından
önemli boyutta otonomi verilmelidir. Elbette bu otonominin boyutları
yasalarla belirlenmelidir.
30. The term “demilitarization” is from Dimitris Tsarouhas and Özkan Duman,
“‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus ‘Demilitarization’ in Turkey,” Armed Forces
and Society 32, no. 3 (2006): 405–23. See also Nilüfer Narli, “Civil–Military
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known as Ergenekon, including various businessmen, academics,
politicians, and military officers, were still under investigation
and trial by judges and prosecutors as of the writing of this
article. Another such set of cases revolving around the Balyoz
(“Sledgehammer”) affair, noted above, are ongoing; these were
front-page news on a daily basis in the early months of 2010.31
Whatever the results of these investigations, the military was no
longer the unequivocal guardian of laiklik, and Turkey took one
more step toward the consolidation of civilian democracy—and a
trend toward a more “passive secular” type regime.
Yet these events raise the question of the political motive behind
the shift from Turkey’s “active secular” regime to a more “passive
secular” type. Did Turkey in fact face a genuine, bona fıde threat
of Islam-based radicalism as the political-partisan strength of the
AK Party increased during the 2000s, as charged by the defenders
of Turkey’s traditional version of laiklik? Noted Turkish scholar
Metin Heper concludes that it emphatically did not; we find his rea-
soning compelling.32 He explains:
the cognitive revolution that the founders of the Turkish Republic tried to
make has been quite successful, and, as a result, (1) the Turkish people,
Relations in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 1, no. 1 (2000), who in 2000 correctly pre-
dicted a diminution of the role of the military (p. 121):
Given the structure of Turkish society, efforts to discredit the military will
lead to political turmoil rather than increased democratization at a time of
political instability. Most important for Turkey’s future stability is the
capacity of civilian governments to maintain harmonious relations with
the military. Relations are challenged by the political tension that has
risen between social classes and antagonism between the military and
radical groups. More democracy, greater prospects for European Union
membership, and enhanced political stability will reduce the military’s
political influence. Restoring Turkey to a functioning democracy will
ease the civil-military partnership and produce civilian dominance.
This forecast materialized to a signficant degree by 2010, despite the
presently questionable progress toward EU membership.
31. The so-called Balyoz affair involved a number of accusations against
various figures in the military establishment, alleging that they concocted
detailed plans to launch a coup, as they saw necessary, depending on the
nature and direction of political change in Turkey—meaning an unacceptable
departure from laiklik.
32. Metin Heper, “Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat in Turkey?,” Compara-
tive Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009): 413–22.
See also, Taha Aykol, “Dindarlik ve laiklik,” Milliyet, October 20, 2009,
www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aType=YazarDetayPrint&ArticleID=1164084
(accessed November 20, 2009).
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the pious as well as the nonreligious, have come to have loyalty to the
secular republic; (2) on the whole the pious are secularized and voluntar-
ily separate religion and politics; and, consequently, (3) the loyalties of the
pious to the secular state do not contradict their religiosity.33
Further, it appears that the underlying social changes in Turkey are
not working against these traits but rather reinforcing them. After
briefly considering these, we turn to the question of the manner
in which forces coming from Turkey’s overall pattern of foreign rela-
tions appear to be further reinforcing them.
Changes in the Character of Civil Society in Turkey:
Consequences for Laiklik
In 2009 Ali Bayramoğlu of the research group TESEV offered the fol-
lowing summary assessment of the changing character of religiosity
in Turkey:
This research basically asserts that while the Islamic segment is becoming
secular on its own, the secular segment is also democratizing. These are
the dominant attitudes of the majority. Rigid Islamic and secular attitudes
constitute the minority. Today the election results, other political mani-
festations, and all societal indicators and measures confirm these
general attitudes.34
The continued modernization of Turkey, especially since the 1980s,
occurred alongside, and perhaps was causally related to, a more
conscious religiosity among a significant sector of the population;
this much is clear. However, it is still not clear how much, and
among which sectors these changes occurred. Nonetheless, Bayra-
moğlu et al. offer the following:
the Islamic movement, especially with the inputs of this approach and the
economic and social changes of the 1980s, has not refrained from produc-
ing its own wave of modernity. The gains of the interactivity initiated
between Islamic actors and the modern sphere have been passed on to
the depths of the Islamic segment, especially by women, where they
have affected a range of elements, from gender relations to the traditional
division of roles. However, the same change paved the way for an assertive
politicization; a dominant, confident, questioning and demanding move-
ment that fed on the above mentioned globalist wave. In this context,
the Islamic movement was politicised through the tension between life-
style and habitat, and was defined by the “identity” or the “identity ori-
ented inclination” with which it reconstructed and reformed its social
attributes.35
33. Ibid., 414.
34. Ali Bayramoğlu, “Modernity,” TESEV, April 2009, 6.
35. Ibid., 92.
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There is evidence that much of the impetus for a changed role of
religion has been from the newly emerged business class. The
same TESEV report also offers:
Certainly, the result of the latest general elections (July 2007 and March
2009) may be interpreted as a significant outcome of the longitudinal
and profound period of transformation whose main dynamics are docu-
mented in this research. As we have professed in the conclusion, the trans-
formation process has basically originated and been led by the middle
class. On the other hand, the transformation process also works back-
wards and includes elements that reshape the middle class in relation
with political attitudes and expectations. As a matter of fact, the majority
of the secular and the Islamic segments share similar views on issues such
as democracy, freedom and human rights.36 (emphasis added)
The proportion of votes won by religiously oriented political parties
in the general parliamentary elections rose from single digits in the
1970s to around one-quarter in the 1990s; in the 2002 and 2007
parliamentary elections, the figures were nearly 70 percent. More-
over, since the military regime of the early 1980s, civil society
organizations in Turkey have generally increased in number and
in influence.37 According to Freedom House, Turkey has experienced
a generally favorable pattern of political change during the past
decade: it began and ended the first decade of the twenty-first
century being “partly free,” although its scores on “political rights”
improved from 4 to 3, and “civil liberties” improving from 5 to 3
from2002to2009(7pointscale,1beinghighest).38Since thisquestion
so directly involves the role of religious groups, and the role of religion
in society and governance, it is worth investigating more closely.
Civil society is the metaphorical “space” between the individual
citizen and the state; it is “civil” to the extent that various groups com-
posing society—including religious ones—have an autonomous
36. Ibid., 13.
37. Sarah Repucci, “Country Report: Turkey,” Freedom House, available online
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7291-8.pdf (accessed
January 1, 2010):
Civic groups have grown in strength and number since the 1980s when
they were mistrusted and tightly controlled. State–societal relations
have improved, and civic groups have become more engaged in public
policy. (p. 6)
She goes on to note, however, that NGOs are often taken to court, and
those advocating human rights (particularly regarding the Kurdish
issue) are especially targeted.
38. Freedom House, “Country Report: Turkey,” Freedom in the World, available
online at www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2009&country
=7722 (accessed February 11, 2010).
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sphere of activity, more or less from state control. In a political system
characterized by civil society, such groups, or individual citizens
acting as such, control the state, rather than vice versa. Civil society
in Western Europe generally emerged as a result of free-market eco-
nomics and commerce as well as other cultural/intellectual forces.
The emergence of civil society in Turkey followed similar patterns
as in Western Europe, however, only considerably later in time, and
with some of the cultural/intellectual forces operating adventitiously.
In Turkey, the rise of civil society generally occurred as a consequence
of liberalization and integration into the world market starting from
the 1980s; yet the more recently emerging civil society and economic
networks are organized around religious poles. These include various
Sufi orders, reading circles, and faith organizations.
Traditional Islamic understanding suggests that the unity of state
and religion (din wa dawla) is an integral part of the faith.39 Islamic
political movements generally emphasize social solidarity and a
central role for the state in the enforcement of that solidarity,
rather than individual autonomy per se. Thus somewhat paradoxi-
cally perhaps, recent civil Islamic movements have been more
focused on individuals and personal relations rather than group
solidarity, which they appear to take more or less for granted. More-
over, they have tended to organize as grassroots movements.
Turkey has experienced dramatic social and economic transforma-
tion since the 1980s, as noted above; perhaps the most prominent
in this period has been the emergence of new “spaces,” metaphori-
cally, between the state and society.40 By pursuing increasingly
liberal economic policies, the state’s previous social monopoly
was challenged on a variety of issues; examples include private
TV channels, private universities, and an increasing array of trade
and professional organizations. Liberalization and deepening inte-
gration of the economy into the global market beginning in the
latter 1980s also had an impact on traditional social dynamics.
The Turkish business elite, which was based in Istanbul and
mostly supported by government incentives and tariffs, formed a
de facto coalition with the military. Also, the Kemalist progressive
elites joined this coalition, which then served as the locomotives
and symbols of Turkish modernity.41 However, liberalism and
39. Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian, Secularism and Islamics Politics,” in Civil
Society in the Middle East, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1996), 2: 17.
40. Ziya Öniş, “Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism
in Critical Perspective,” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 4 (2004): 113–34;
Hasan Cemal, Özal Hikayesi (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2000).
41. Murat Gültekingil and Tanıl Bora, eds., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce
Cilt 2: Kemalizm, 6th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009).
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integration to the global market stimulated the emergence of an
Anatolian bourgeoisie and an alternative (i.e., nonsocially secular-
ized) modernity. As a result of the rising of an Anatolian business
class, traditional Istanbul-based capital looked for new markets
with which to integrate, and thus increasingly oriented itself into
the European Union accession process. This Istanbul-based bour-
geoisie thus revised its ties with the army and the Kemalist elite.
Because of the significance of this trend, it will be useful to
examine the new Anatolian business class more closely.
The Anatolian business class is usefully organized into several
different forms, with correspondingly different aspects of political
significance regarding religion and politics. First, there is the Inde-
pendent Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD), formed in 1990 by
a group of conservative–religious industrialists and businessmen
who separated from the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmens’
Association (TÜSİAD). Second, there is The Union of Chambers
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), which played a
more traditional role in the development of civil society. Established
in 1950, it describes its purpose thus:
TOBB aims, parallel to the developments elsewhere in the world and in its
capacity of the highest level representative of the Turkish private sector, at
ensuringunityand solidaritybetweenchambers and commodityexchanges,
enhancing development of the professions in conformance with general
interest, facilitating professional work of members, promoting honesty
and confidence in the relations of members with one another and with the
general public, and preserving professional discipline and ethics.42
The Islamic scholar Ali Bulaç described TOBB as having energized
and propelled itself into a much more active role in Turkish society,
with consequent changes in its manner of governance.43 More gen-
erally, the emergence of the Anatolian business class challenged the
definition of secularism in Turkey. Kahraman notes, we believe
essentially correctly, that “Turkish secularism removes Islam from
the public space, completely limiting it to conscience and personal
42. TOBB, “Purposes of TOBB,” from its official Web site, http://www.tobb.org.
tr/eng/tobbhakkinda/purposes.php (accessed on February 24, 2010).
43. Ali Bulaç, “Darbeler ve TOBB,” Zaman, January 15, 2010:
Hisarcıklıoğlu’nun başında bulunduğu TOBB, Anadolu’nun beşeri ve ikti-
sadi enerjisini, gücünü ve ileriye dönük performansını temsil eder.
Üyeleri, asli ana gövdeleriyle 1929’dan beri CHP’nin 6 ok’undan biri "dev-
letçilik" ilkesinin arkasına gizlenerek devletten beslenmiyorlar.. . .Yaşadı-
ğımız büyük politik ve fikri değişimin iktisadi boyutunu ne TÜSİAD ne
onu taklit eden MÜSİAD doğru okuyor. Anadolu iktisadi alanda da
kendi mecrasını bulacaktır.
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private practice and space and never refers to it as a part of admin-
istrative process.”44 After the foundation of the Republic, various
interpretations of Islam, Sufi orders, and dervish lodges with the
use of religious titles were banned.45 Moreover, only one Orthodox
Hanafi school of Islam is tied to state control by the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs. State intervention in religious affairs has historically
been a manifestation of the prevailing concept of laiklik as it per-
tained to society’s perceived need for progress in moderniza-
tion—particularly the military’s concept of progress, as noted
above. But as also noted above, that entire picture of civil–military
power relations is changing, and is doing so largely on the basis of
the underlying changes in society. The alternative modernity of
Islamic movements in Turkey has mostly focused on individuals
and civil life, rather than demanding a top-down, clerical-type
organizational structure of society. As Yavuz accurately indicated:
“In Turkey, the economic reforms were welcomed and embraced
by society-centered Islamic movements that appropriated Islamic
symbols for the marketplace to encourage the production of reli-
gious interpretations, values, and meaning through business and
patterns of consumption.”46
Liberal economic policies since the latter 1980s also spawned the
emergence of a new urban middle class. Both the rising Anatolian
bourgeois and the rising urban middle class adopted a curious life-
style combining traditional rural values with urban norms. The new
urban population, who are rational, religious, and urbanized,
depended on various networks to accommodate themselves to the
new city life. This situation created a new type of civil society, newly
rooted in urban market relations, but whose worldview has been
directly shaped by traditional concepts of Islam.47 Viewed from this
perspective, it is easy to see, in retrospect, how Islam became increas-
ingly salient, politically, despite the context of a secular state in which
these social changes were occurring. But what social forms did these
changes assume? Two major Islamic movements in contemporary
Turkish society are particularly important, namely the Nakşibendi
Sufi Order and Fethullah Gülen Movement.
44. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “From Culture of Politics to Politics of Culture,” in
Remaking Turkey, ed. Fuat Keyman (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 57.
45. Tekke ve Zaviyelerle Türbelerin Seddine ve Türbedarlıklar ile Birtakım
Unvanların Men ve İlgasına Dair Kanun, November 30, 1925; for the full text,
see: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/390.html.
46. Hakan Yavuz, “Opportunity, Spaces, Identity and Islamic Meaning in
Turkey,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Theory Approach, ed. Quinton Wiktoro-
wicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 270.
47. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003), 81.
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The Nakşibendi Sufi Order has networks and branches in a variety
of countries from Central Asia to Europe. In Turkey, there are
numerous branches and most operate under the Khaliddiye
School, namely the İsmailağa, Erenköy, Yahyalı, Menzil, and İsker-
derpaşa branches. In all of these branches, the Order is known as
the most politically active Sufi Order in Turkey. The rise of this
Order is also correlated with the rise of the new urban middle
class. Yavuz has accurately pointed out: “The Nakşibendi Orders,
along with their complex web of institutions and practices, success-
fully expanded their influence and created new social, cultural and
economic spaces that exist independent of state control.”48 Given
the history of Turkey’s version of political secularism, this is, of
course, a very significant development.
The Fethullah Gülen Movement differs from the Nakşibendi Sufi
Orders. The Fethullah Gülen movement operates through networks
organized in Nur reading circles scattered around the country.
Moreover, with the opening of social “spaces” between the state
and individuals, this neo-Nurcu-Gülen movement has gained a
huge number of followers through the country, and has four main
objectives. These are to (1) promote a religious-communal form of
Turkish nationalism; (2) advance Anglo-Saxon secularism over the
French Jacobin version; (3) seek international support for domestic
endeavors; (4) challenge the Kemalist monopoly on education.49
Through time the movement has been strengthened by the founda-
tion of a number of Nurcu media and educational institutions. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the movement endeavored to
spread into the Central Asian countries by founding Turkish
schools. The Gülen Movement presently has millions of followers,
great economic and political power, various media institutions,
and hundreds of schools and universities all over the world.50
Along with the Sunni Islamic movements, the religious minority
Alevis have also emerged as a form of civil society; given their size
of approximately 10–15 percent of the overall population, this is par-
ticularly significant. The immigration from Anatolian town to urban
areas, namely Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, led the Alevi population to
congregate in certain areas as a group. Especially in Istanbul, violent
struggles have occurred between Alevis and police forces on several
occasions. Alevi identity is generally associated within Turkey’s
secular political discourse; starting from the late 1960s, Alevi iden-
tity increasingly took form as a political as well as a religious identity.
48. Ibid., 149.
49. Ibid., 203.
50. See Graham Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in
the Muslim World (Washington: The U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2008).
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Two dynamics shaped that process. Parallel with rapid urbanization,
newly urbanized Alevi groups sought out camaraderie. The quest for
fellowship, as Ferguson defines it, is a prominent pillar of civil
society. Alevi civil society grew powerfully by seeking fellowship in
an otherwise alien urban setting. Also, Alevi groups grew stronger
as a reaction to the revival of Sunni Islamic movements. Specifically
the Gazi and Madımak events stimulated this interactive strengthen-
ing of Alevi civil society.51 The net result was a much more religiously
politicized society by the time of the early twenty-first century, but
with this came new problems for laiklik, since the Alevis were—and
still are as of this writing—an “unrecognized” religious minority.
In response to the growing political salience of the Alev community,
and as part of the shifting conception and reworking of laiklik, the AK
Party government held a number of workshops to resolve the various
Alevi-related issues and problems, including their religious status as
minorities. However, Alevi organizations were deeply skeptical
about the AK Party government’s good will in this regard, and
perhaps understandably, given the long history of the manner in
which previous regimes discounted religious minorities. Two particu-
lar aspects of the workshops are noteworthy. First, the leading Alevi
organizations, namely the Alevi Kültür Dernekleri and the Hacı
Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı, protested the meeting and did not
attend the workshops.52 Moreover, the chairman of the Hacı Bektaş
Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı, Ali Balkız, harshly criticized the Work-
shop’s Report. He offered: “this report is a fraud. It is a virtual
report with lack of good-will. This report does not solve problems
but creates new ones. It is an AKP project that portends new steps
towards Sharia-type rule.”53 He added that any Alevi who accepts
this report as a solution would be considered excommunicated (“Bu
belgeyi olumlu bulanlar bizden değildir”—literally, “not one of us”).54
The Alevi community’s concern regarding AK Party policies on the
Alevi question and laiklik more generally stems from sensitive
51. See Oral Çalışlar, Aleviler (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2009); Elise Massicard,
Türkiye’den Avrupa’ya Alevi Hareketinin Siyasallaşması (Istanbul: İletişim Yayı-
nevi, 2007); Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Ozdalga, and Catharina Raudvere, Alevi
Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1998).
52. Alevi Çalıştayı Aleviler olmadan toplanacak (Alevi Workshop will meet
without Alevi participation), Radikal Online, http://www.radikal.com.tr/
Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=977190&CategoryID=77
(accessed January 28, 2010).
53. In the original Turkish, the statement was: Rapor bir aldatmacadır. Sanaldır,
maksatlıdır, iyi niyetten yoksun, sorun çözen değil yeni sorunlar yaratan, şeriata
doğru giden yolda yeni adımlar öngören bir AKP projesidir.
54. Hükümete zehir zemberek çıkış: Sünni ulema gibi!, CNN Turk, http://www.
cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/02/12/alevi.calistayi.raporu.alevileri.boldu/563501.
0/index.html (accessed February 12, 2010).
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historical dynamics—in this sense, significantly, the regime’s treat-
ment of the Alevi community is emblematic of its orientation
toward laiklik. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is dominated by the
Sunni branch of Islam; therefore, the Alevi community favors abol-
ishing this institution. Second, the Alevi worship places, called
Cemevi, are not considered temples or mosques as such and are
thus not officially recognized by the state; Alevi groups object to
this. Third, Alevis advocate the abolition of obligatory religion
courses in elementary and high school. Since these courses generally
focus on Sunni Islam, the Alevi community regards their content as
alien. Finally, Alevis object to a law dating to 1924 which banned
the dervish lodges. According to that law, no one shall be titled
“Baba,” “Şeyh,” “Derviş,” etc. Since the religious title of “Baba” is
used by Alevi leaders and preachers, these leaders have no formal
recognition or status recognized by the state, and are technically
outside the law.55 This is no small matter, since religious leaders
are appointed by the national Ministry of Religious Affairs. Resolu-
tion of the Alevi question thus requires a shift of Turkey’s entire
secular conception, almost certainly toward one more along the
lines of a “passive secular” state. For now, however, the Alevi com-
munity remains skeptical of AK Party government gestures, since
the above-mentioned core political requests of the Alevi community
remain unresolved, and the Workshop Report resolutely rejected by
the Alevi groups. The first step, perhaps, might even be an essentially
symbolic but politically meaningful gesture, such as the founding of
a memorial museum to Madımak Oteli, who holds a significant and
defining role in Alevi communal memory and identity. But this
request has also been rejected by the regime.
There is also a new dimension of liberalized civil society which
supports change in the meaning of laiklik. The liberal-leftist com-
munity includes pro-EU intellectuals and leftist-liberals who view
traditional laiklik as too constrictive. However, the impact and prac-
tical participation of such groups remain quite small, especially
compared with the power of the business elite or religious net-
works. Nonetheless, Ahmet İnsel, a former member of New Left
Party Initiative, defines their understanding of secularism as:
Laiklik means separation of religious affairs from government. But the
Ottoman and modern Turkish state traditions in fact never experienced
such a separation. In (genuine) laiklik, the state would not intervene into
religious affairs; if it does, then the state itself becomes a part of the reli-
gion. Therefore, our understanding of secularism would be for the state
to fully extract itself from religious affairs. There would thus be neither
55. Taha Akyol, “Alevi Açılımı ve Laiklik,” Milliyet, February 16, 2010.
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obligatory religious courses nor even a Ministry of Religious Affairs itself,
as a state institution.56
Such a characterization will, of course, sound very familiar to Amer-
icans, since it clearly reflects a “passive secular” orientation on the
part of the state. We find it highly significant that calls for such an
orientation in Turkey are coming from so many disparate sources,
largely based on an energized, increasingly vibrant civil society.
Yet the transition to such a civil society has deepened the divides
in Turkey, and particularly in the political realm. The rising power of
various religious movements sparked serious reaction from
Turkey’s traditionally secular elite. Moreover, the AK Party govern-
ment’s Islamic background and orientation necessarily and inevita-
bly raised skepticism among nonreligious groups, even among
those who also favored change in the effective political substance
of laiklik, even if for somewhat different reasons—namely political
prudence. If the AK Party government should fail to demonstrate
good will and create political conditions in which a general consen-
sus among these groups might be found, then Turkey’s reformation
and transition regarding laiklik could be postponed or thwarted
altogether. Moreover, Turkish society would almost certainly slide
into an even harsher, deeper political distrust and polarization
than has emerged thus far. At this point it is useful to consider
the broader international framework in which this deepening polar-
ization within Turkish society is occurring.
Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: The
External Dimension
A dynamic process of interaction between domestic and interna-
tional politics has affected religion–state relations in Turkey,
56. In the original Turkish:
Laiklik devletle din işlerinin ayrılmasıdır. Bu Osmanlı-Türkiye Sünni
devlet geleneğinin hiç bilmediği bir şey. Laiklikte devlet din alanına
girmez, girdiği andan itibaren devlet taraftır. Dolayısıyla bizim laiklik
anlayışımız, devletin din alanından bütünüyle çekilmesidir. Ne zorunlu
din eğitimi, ne devlet politikası olarak Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı kesinlikle
söz konusu olamaz.
Ahmet İnsel’Yeni Sol’u anlatıyor, Radikal Online, http://www.radikal.
com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=980992&Date=19.
02.2010&CategoryID=78 (accessed February19, 2010). Also for more on
Turkish Left, see: Murat Belge, “Nationalism, Democracy and the Left in
Turkey,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 30, no. 1 (2009): 7–20. Ahmet
İnsel, Solu Yeniden Tanımlamak (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2009).
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particularly since the early-to-mid-1990s. This is due to several
major dimensions of Turkish foreign policy. These are numerous,
but the most significant are: (1) relentless pursuit of EU accession
byevery civilian Turkish government since the 1960s; (2) geopolitical
fallout of the collapse of communism in the former USSR and Eastern
Europe, particularly Turkey’s relations with Russia; (3) the so-called
war on terrorism led by the United States and selected allies since
2001; and (4) the larger pattern of regional dynamics, particularly
the confounding intermix of issues related to Turkish–Armenian
relations and the closely related matter of Nagorno–Karabagh. The
picture is complicated by the fact that each of these major dimen-
sions of foreign relations has affected religion–state relations in
Turkey rather differently. In aggregate, however, it appears that the
interplayof domestic social and political changewith the more press-
ing contemporary foreign policy issues has had the effect of further
pushing Turkish laiklik in the direction of “passive secularism.”
(1) The EU accession process must be placed at the top of the list
of factors that have most directly affected religion–state relations in
Turkey. The prospect of EU membership catalyzed significant polit-
ical change in Turkey.57 This process has been critically important
to the formation, and re-formation, of political ideas and sense of
political identity.58 An important question, it seems, is whether
the social forces noted in previous sections of this article would
have effectively given rise to a more passively secular state, in and
of themselves. But that question is essentially a counterfactual
one and beyond the scope of this essay. At the very least, nonethe-
less, the prospect of EU membership worked in conjunction with an
increasingly fertile domestic political environment for such a shift
in the character of laiklik to occur. According to a recent considera-
tion of this matter, the prospect of EU membership may have been
the critical element in this shift:
[T]he transformation of Turkish political Islam has produced an alterna-
tive, liberal version of secularism; yet, it has not resolved deep social divi-
sions. Building a liberal consensus between religious conservatives and
secularists is imperative for the resolution of deep social divisions in
57. Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Democratization ‘From Below’ in
Turkey” (presented paper at the biannual conference of the European Union
Studies Association, Austin, Texas, March 31–April 2, 2005), 15; available
online at aei.pitt.edu/3018/02/kubicek-austin_paper.doc (accessed February
25, 2010).
58. Paul Kubicek, “The European Union, European Identity, and Political Clea-
vages in Turkey” (presented paper at the biannual conference of the European
Union Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, April 23–25, 2009); avail-
able online at http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/kubicek_04D.pdf
(accessed November 19, 2009).
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Turkey. The European Union as a guarantor and initiator of reform could
play a major role in building trust between the secularist and the religious
conservative segments of society.59
(2) The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in
the USSR in 1991 eliminated the military and ideological threat
posed by the USSR and its allies; Turkey nonetheless continued
membership in NATO. We noted above the general shift in threat-
perception within Turkey during the 1990s from primarily external
threats to internal ones. At least two large-scale political changes
occurred as a result: first, relations with Russia began to dramatically
improve, particularly in the first Erdogan administration60; and
second, by focusing on the perceived internal threats of radical
Islam and Kurdish separatism, the door was opened politically for
a fundamental reconceptualization of the meaning of laiklik pre-
cisely because the magnification of the salience of these issues
demanded a rethinking of what it means to be a “secular state.”
Turkish relations with Russia were historically not good until the
time of the Turkish Republic, and during the Cold War were gener-
ally characterized by distrust and suspicion even amid considerable
cooperation on some issues such as trade and technological assis-
tance.61 Nonetheless, significant commercial ties began to develop
even during the Cold War, particularly during the first Erdogan
administration (2002–2007), and dramatically improved relations
emerged.62 It is difficult if not impossible to gauge the degree to
which the Russian–Turkish rapprochement of the 2000s was
59. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Islam and Democratization in Turkey: Secularism
and Trust in a Divided Society,” Democratization 16, no. 6 (2009): 1194.
60. Igor Torbakov, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish–Russian
Relations,” Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper (October 2007), http://
www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Jamestown-TorbakovTurkeyRussia.pdf
(accessed February 22, 2010).
61. Erel Tellal, Uluslararasi ve Bölgesel Gelismeler Cercevisinde: SSCB–Turkiye
Iliskileri 1953–1964 (Ankara: Mulkiyeliler Birligi Vakfı Yayınları, 2000).
62. See Lerna Yanik, “Allies or Partners? An Appraisal of Turkey’s Ties to Russia:
1991–2007,”East EuropeanQuarterlyXLI,no.3 (2007): 349–70; JamesW. Warhola
and William A. Mitchell, “The Warming of Turkish–Russian Relations: Motives and
Implications,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization
(Winter 2006): 127–43; and Igor Torbakov, ibid., who as of 2007 remained quite
skeptical about the prospects for further and durable Turkish–Russian rap-
prochement. For an updated view, and one that is considerably more optimistic
about the prospects for the solidification and advancement of closer Turkish–
Russian relations, see Ilyas Kamalov, “Rusya’da Turk Yili ve Turk-Rus Iliskilleri,”
Stratejik Analiz, no. 98 (June 2008), 6, and particularly Bulent Aras, “Turkey and
the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multi-Dimensional Partnership,” SETA
Policy Brief 35 (August 2009), available online at http://www.setav.org/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=935&Itemid=68 (accessed 22 February,
2010).
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motivated on Russia’s part by strategic considerations regarding
religion; however, it is clear from Russia’s own experience with
radical, Islamic-based terrorism that the last thing Russia would
want is a “radically Islamicized” Turkey so near its own southwest-
ern flank. Perhaps the eagerness with which Russia has pursued
closer relations with Turkey has been augmented by a desire to
help entrench a politically moderate regime (regarding religion, at
least) in Turkey. Viewed from Moscow’s perspective, a moderately
religious AK Party-led Turkey is surely preferable to an Iran-type
clerical regime—and also to a staunchly pro-Western, “actively
secular” military establishment such as that which brought about
the “soft coup” of February 1997. Interestingly, the increased inter-
weaving of religious symbolism and motifs in Russian high politics
in the 1990s occurred more or less simultaneously with the escala-
tion of partisan strength of religious-oriented parties in Turkey; this
is not to suggest that the two trends were causally related, but it is
clear that the dramatic turn in Turkish–Russian relations in 2004–
2005 occurred with the Kremlin quite comfortable in cooperating
with an avowedly Islamic-oriented government. The Turkish
secular elite’s angst with the AK Party government was simply not
shared by Moscow. As of this writing, Turkish–Russian relations
have only continued to improve.
(3) The U.S.-led “war on terrorism” beginning in 2001 profoundly
affected Turkish domestic and foreign policy, with short, medium,
and long-term consequences. One particularly notable effect was
the energizing of anti-American sentiments in a manner that has
ironically created more hospitable domestic political conditions
for the emergence of an American-type disposition to the question
of religion–state relations. The “war on terrorism” spawned anti-
American sentiments in Turkey that almost certainly would not
have otherwise emerged. These have to do with: (1) the war in Iraq
and its complex reconfiguring of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and
the region; (2) the diplomatic attitude of the United States, and (3)
specific policies pursued toward Turkey. As noted by Aylin Guney
in 2008, “all segments of Turkish society as well as the state have
become intensely critical of American policies to an extent that
has not been seen before.”63 Again, ironically, the disposition of
the Turkish government toward the meaning and outworking of
laiklik took on an increasingly American-type orientation and all
the while anti-American sentiments steadily rose. A more detailed
63. Aylin Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” Middle
Eastern Studies 44, no. 3 (2008): 484. See also her article “An Anatomy of the
Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From ‘Cold War’ to ‘War on Iraq’,”
Turkish Studies 6, no. 3 (2005): 341–59.
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and expansive explanation of how and why this occurred remains
outside the scope of this brief essay, but certainly warrants
investigation.
(4) Finally, the tangled political, military, and cultural relations
with the Caucasus region, especially Azerbaijan and Armenia,
must be taken into account in reckoning the foreign policy consid-
erations influencing the meaning of laiklik at home. Such influences
appear to be more indirect than direct. Nonetheless, Turkey’s more
or less consistent and unequivocal support for Azerbaijan, against
Armenia on Nagorno–Karabagh, and on most other matters,
included a religious dimension. The interplay of domestic and inter-
national factors on these matters is exceptionally complex, and can
only be briefly touched on here. It is by no means clear that the
momentum gained in 2008–2009 from the so-called football diplo-
macy will continue and manifest itself in friendly, trusting relations.
Paradoxically, however, the diplomatic opening with Armenia in
2008 that signaled a sea change in bilateral relations was more
likely to have occurred on the basis of the AK Party’s broad
foreign policy of “no enemies” and also upon a moderately reli-
giously oriented governmental disposition than the previously
hardline, essentially nationalist disposition pursued by previous
regimes which viewed laiklik as rigidly as they viewed the prospect
of reconciling with as previously implacable a diplomatic foe as
Armenia. There is no hard evidence that the relation was causal,
but it is noteworthy that, from an American “passive secular” per-
spective at least, the conciliatory moderation in this domain of
foreign policy came from an administration that pursued a similar
moderation with regard to the crucial question of religion–state
relations.
Conclusions: Future Directions of Religion–State
Relations?
The Republic of Turkey was established as a secular state in the
early 1920s, and has remained so ever since. The meaning of that
phrase is ambiguous in any context, however, and each political
regime founded upon the principle of a secular state necessarily
possesses unique features. Turkey’s secular state was clearly of
the “active secular” type for nearly the entire history of the Repub-
lic, as evidenced by strict control of religious leadership, education,
formal recognition (or lack thereof) of religious communities, and
in general a state-controlled political climate in terms of the role
of religion in the public sphere. That has all been subtly but unmis-
takably changing during the 2000s, and appears quite likely to
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continue doing so for the foreseeable future. It will likely do so in a
manner that manifests itself in changes in the political structure
itself, even though it is not likely—at all—that the bedrock principle
of laiklik will even be seriously questioned, let alone abandoned.
That is not the issue; instead, the issue is what does laiklik mean?
The short answer is that laiklik has been slowly, subtly, but signifi-
cantly shifting in the direction of a “passive secular” type of state–
religion relation. This shift is occurring amid transformation in the
character of Turkish society itself. The political significance of this
aggregate of changes is profound and widespread. Should it con-
tinue, it would appear to more or less definitively answer the ques-
tion dogging Western theoretical social science (and policy
discourse as well) about the prospect of liberal democracy (as reli-
gious freedom, understood from an American, passive secular per-
spective at least) successfully functioning in a predominantly
Moslem society. In some respects, that question would appear to
have been answered by the fact that most Moslems in the world
were living in countries designated “free” or at least “partly free”
according to the 2009 reckoning of Freedom House—e.g., Indonesia,
Bangladesh, Senegal, and others well beyond Turkey.64
The change in laiklik in Turkey may also have significant, wide-
spread ramifications for foreign relations among countries in the
region, and perhaps far beyond. If nothing else, the shift toward a
more moderated degree of state control of religion, specifically
toward a more “passively secular type,” could well have the effect
of blunting the attraction of radicalized religion. It is also possible
that such moderation will help provide a political foundation for
coping with the deepening polarization within Turkish society,
noted variously in this essay and elsewhere.65 Thus in this case,
as in so many other domains of governance, the classic, time-
honored, and cardinal virtue of moderation will be seen to have
numerous and compounding benefits.
64. “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=15 (accessed March 1, 2010).
65. “Turkey in Transit: Democratization in Turkey,” Special Report, Freedom
House; available online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_
report/65.pdf (accessed February 26, 2010). The report concludes:
Overall, Turkey has shown impressive progress in democratic political
reform, economic liberalization and serious commitment to European-
oriented reforms. . . . Over the coming years, however, even more effort
is needed to overcome the often bruising political polarization, while
making sure that gains in freedom of expression, human rights, and
good governance are taking roots and the risk of backsliding is avoided.
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